BDIR Podcast Episode-010 - To Agent, or not to Agent, that is the question



  • To Agent, or not to Agent, that is the question

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Mitre ATT&CK: What is it, how to use, and apply it to your organization

When - April 9th - 1 Day

Where - HouSecCon - Houston Texas


Malware Discovery and Basic Analysis - Michael Gough

When - April 10th-11th - 2 Days

Where - BSidesOK - Tulsa Oklahoma



Insurance Company refuses to pay NotPetrya Bill, says it was an act of war, company sues for $100m

2-Factor Auth bypassed ???

773 Milllllion passwords circulating the Internet from past breaches

Bypass blacklisted words filter (or firewalls) via wildcards


  • C:\>powershell C:\??*?\*3?\c?lc.?x?                        calc

  • C:\>powershell C:\*\*2\n??e*d.*                     notepad

  • C:\>powershell C:\*\*2\t?s*r.*                        taskmgr


1.  Malware Archaeology - Home of the ‘WIndows Logging Cheat Sheet(s)‘

  • Windows and Windows Advanced Logging Cheat Sheets updated


  1. BDIR -

2. BDIR - LastPass or equivalent


  1. First Sednit UEFI Rootkit Unveiled


  • Drops rpcnetp.exe into \system32 - installs as a service

  • Injects Dll into svchost and then Internet Explorer

  • Replaces Autochk.exe - Checks your disks, so DISK ACCESS !!!

  • Drops Autoche which becomes AutoChk.exe

  • Found another binary named info_efi.exe on some systems with LoJack

  • Found RWEverything Kernel driver tool

  • Found ReWriter_read.exe to dump SPI Flash memory

  • Found ReWriter_binary.exe.. You guessed it, adds rootkit to the firmware

  • Modifies Registry %WINDIR%\System32\config\SYSTEM

    1. Changes “autocheck autochk*” to “autocheck autoche*”

  • HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager\BootExecute


    1. Enable Secure Boot

  • Firmware Security Assessments using CHIPSEC


  • TZWorks suite of bootdisk tools



To Agent, or NOT to agent, that is the question

So you were copied on a Twitter conversation by Frank McGovern…

  1. It started out from Florian Roth talking about CrowdStrike’s dividing endpoint solution into 3 categories

  2. But it morphed into something else.  Anton Chuvakin replied to your copy and then Richard Bejtlich (BateLick) chimed in about quantity of agents and it went from there and also included Thomas Fischer and Greg Barnes too….

  3. So describe how the conversation started and then went

  4. MG describes

  5. So it took a turn into how many agents are acceptable or wanted on any individual system

  6. Discussion…

  7. Who decides what agents get used and installed?

  8. Would a pilot and testing help here?

  9. And why I asked about scheduled tasks running occasional checks

  10. So whatever endpoint solution(s) you choose, make them easy and simple, wishfully set and forget

  11. We have to seriously look at an approach to securing our endpoints, maybe an agent for everything is not desirable, what other options do we have?

  12. Your AV/EDR choices should get you 80% there

  13. What do we do about the last 20%?

  14. Focus on Detection and Threat Hunting using the tools, maybe agentless solutions to avoid agent bloat


None this month, look up the Twitter conversation


BDIR Podcast Episode-009 - MITRE ATT&CK Part 2




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Data Breaches in the Last 30 Days Affect A Billion People - WAAY 31 ABC


  • Q&A website Quora was hacked this week as well, potentially exposing data and private messages from 100 million users.

    The FBI is investigating a cyber breach of the National Republican Congressional Committee

    Dell, the computer company, announced a security breach although it does not believe consumer data was exposed.

    The city of Ames, Iowa had its parking ticket system breached, exposing ticket payer data.

    Dunkin' (formerly Dunkin Donuts) had its perks reward club database hacked.

    Atrium Health had 2.6 million patient records exposed

    A breach potential exposed Medical Informatics Engineering’s 3.9 million patient records across 12 states.

    41,000+ cancer patients had their records potentially exposed at Cancer Center Treatment of America's Arizona facility.

    Vision Direct handles payments for Visa, Mastercard, Maestro, and PayPal. It got hit.

    Millions of passengers of Cathay Pacific airline are at risk from a security breach.

    Also breached: US Postal Service, 1-800-Flowers, Butler County, OH's HIPAA records, and Nordstorm.

    Did we mention breaches at: Amazon, 1-877-Kars-4-Kids, Florida Department of Health, or Healthcare.Gov, or Commonwealth Bank?

Dell Forces Password Reset for Online Customers Following Data Breach

Marriott Starwood breached - Sheraton users beware...


1.  Malware Archaeology - Home of the ‘WIndows Logging Cheat Sheet(s)‘

2. MITRE ATT&CK website


  1. KANSA - PowerShell IR tool



  1. LOKIBot

  • Delivered by Word Doc, EXE, or MSI from a link or attachment in and email


  • MSI Installer user interaction with GUI, so user has to approve installation

  • The user sees the installer start if you agree, of course people do

  • After it installs it just disappears

  • Places the payload in C:\Windows installer, an MSI feature

  • Deletes from Windows Installer and then places itself in C:\Users\<Bob>\AppData\Roaming with a name of Androidsomething in this sample

  • Directory is attrib +S +H as is the file

  • The original MSXYZ.tmp is loaded in memory, the copy on disk is not loaded

    Did not seem to have a persistence, maybe time delayed longer than we saw

    It was easily visible in Running Processes, a new feature of LOG-MD-Pro

    The .tmp file also called out to a C2 server

    Lesson Learned

  • BLOCK MSI attachments, no reason this should come in from email

  • If received from a link, that is more of a challenge

  • Check your running processes for items that are no longer on disk, so cannot be hashed, always bad

  • Look for parentless processes as MsiExec was the parent of the .tmp file that was loaded.

  • Same hash as the .EXE stored under \Roaming



Listen to Part 1 with Katie Nickels from MITRE and the Show Notes here:


  • At the end of the Show Notes




SANS THIR (Threat Hunting & Incident Response Summit - New Orleans 2018

Marriott Starwood/Sheraton Breach

  • Free WebWatcher Enrollment


      Marriott is providing guests the opportunity to enroll in WebWatcher free of charge for one year. WebWatcher monitors internet sites where personal information is shared and generates an alert to the consumer if evidence of the consumer’s personal information is found. Due to regulatory and other reasons, WebWatcher or similar products are not available in all countries. Guests from the United States who complete the WebWatcher enrollment process will also be provided fraud consultation services and reimbursement coverage for free.

      The section below provides additional information on steps you can take. If you have questions about this notification and to enroll in WebWatcher (if it is available in your country), please visit

      * Starwood brands include: W Hotels, St. Regis, Sheraton Hotels & Resorts, Westin Hotels & Resorts, Element Hotels, Aloft Hotels, The Luxury Collection, Tribute Portfolio, Le Méridien Hotels & Resorts, Four Points by Sheraton and Design Hotels. Starwood branded timeshare properties are also included.RDP Thriving on the Dark Web

Endgame - Putting the MITRE ATT&CK Evaluation into Context

Dark Reading - MITRE Changes the Game in Security Product Testing

JPCert Detecting Laternal Movement


BDIR Podcast Episode-008 - Special


JOIN US FOR EPISODE-008, a Special Edition:

  • EPIC FAILURE, Who Do You Blame? You decide

Join our #Slack Channel! Email us at or or DM us on Twitter @brakesec

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A tweet from Dave Kennedy on TrustedSec efforts

  • “On a screenshare with my team on an engagement watching our completely custom exploitation framework + C2 being deployed and using undoc techniques all the way through with a ton of EPP/EDR products on the endpoint without detection. Proud of the research team and #TrustedSec :)“

NSS Labs fires off anti-malware-testing lawsuit at infosec toolmakers

Are they colluding to NOT fail the tests?

The report "Endpoint Detection and Response Market by Component (Solution and Service), Enforcement Point (Workstations, Mobile Devices, Servers, POS Terminals), Deployment Mode, Organization Size, Vertical, and Region - Global Forecast to 2021", The EDR market size is estimated to grow from USD 749.0 million in 2016 to USD 2,285.4 Million by 2021, at an estimated Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 25.0%.

Gartner says EDR will be a 1.5 BILLION, with a B business by 2020

EDR Market by 2020.gif

Michael’s DerbyCon 2017 talk on Testing EDR

Michael and BRIAN talk Credential Stealing at BSides Austin 2018

Forrester Report on is EDR overblown

Interesting quote from the article

“At its core, EDR turns your infrastructure into a fabric of queryable systems with scalable remote management capabilities and the ability to detect abuse. Done. That’s it. This is only tangentially a security tool and it’s time to reframe how we think about EDR into that of a SecOps tool”


1.  None this episode


  1. None this episode


  • None this episode


EPIC FAILURE, Who Do You Blame? You decide


  • Less than a dozen offices

  • Network devices with IPS

  • DNS Proxy on all endpoints

  • MSP Agent

  • EDR agent

  • No Admin rights on endpoints

  • DevOps app deployed nightly


With all this in place, A brute force against an Internet facing RDP server open for employee use and subsequent infection of over 150 assets within 20 minutes of initial infection (Patient 0).


The Volume Shadow Service (VSS) retention period was at the default retention period is too short such that by the time the root cause was found and went to roll back infections, VSS had already written infected files to storage and rollback wasn't an option.


The first infection Credentials were circumvented due to the threat agent using the System Management software suite (name a few) to kill the EDR services then infect the machine.

The EDR vendor did everything they could to understand and report on the issue. They paid to have the server shipped to them where they completed a full forensic analysis subsequently proving how the service was terminated and then infected.

The 2nd infection, was missed by EDR but was caught by AV that was installed the same day to see what it would find.

They do know the current recommendation from IT Security thought leaders is to use a blended solution like EDR and AV. But money isn't endless for clients so that may be problematic.

A Log Mgmt solution was deployed after the fact and discovered a lot happening in the environment of which stunned the staff.

EDR Vendor position

The position was taken the open RDP connection was the root cause and EDR was not at fault for not catching or rolling back the infection.

So let’s look at what they did RIGHT…

  • Endpoint users were not admins

  • EDR on the endpoints

  • DNS proxy agent on the endpoints

  • DevOps pushed out updates nightly

So let’s look at what went wrong here...

  • RDP Facing the Internet

    • RDP on the Internet with just username and password is one, if not the RISKIEST things you can do as a company, goes for all Remote Access

    • If you don’t use 2-Factor AND collecting login attempts, you WILL get owned

  • The credential that was brute forced turned out to be an admin account with access to their System Management Software solution

  • They did NOT look for, or detect the brute force of an Internet facing system for remote access

  • The account used for System Management Software had access to the Internet?

  • Accounts for remote access should not have admin access, use a separate account that has to be entered once logged in to reduce this type of threat, consider a jump host to get to these management solutions

  • Logging was not enabled or used until after the event started

  • Logs were not collected or managed in any way

  • Logging was used only AFTER the event started, where they saw a stunning amount of information

  • No AV, just EDR was installed

  • EDR was stopped by an approved System Management solution designed to do this type of activity

  • The System Management solution was not being monitored for access

  • The EDR vendor did not seem to have a service status option (a flaw with many Security tools, if the agent is stopped, how is it detected? The Windows Advanced Logging Cheat Sheet” covers this type of non-Windows service permission changes to capture logging of services that are stopped


FireEye Baselining RDP

RDP Thriving on the Dark Web

Using RDP? Make your business less of a target for Ransomware

Gartner’s 2018 Magic Quadrant for Endpoint Protection Platforms (EPP): What’s Changed?

Endpoint Detection and Response: A New Wave in Security?


BDIR Podcast Episode-007

JOIN US FOR EPISODE-007, where we will discuss MITRE ATT&CK and OUR GUEST WILL BE:

  • Katie Nickels, ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Lead, MITRE

  • @likethecoins and @MITREattack

Join our #Slack Channel! Email us at or or DM us on Twitter @brakesec

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Credit Freezes after Sept 21st, 2018 are FREEEEEE

Brian Krebs article

Track your luggage or Tracking YOU ?

"Do you use a Tumi bag? Registered it with Tumi's Tracer service? Your bag might not be the only thing being tracked. A reliable source we know told us that one way or another, Tumi may have lost track of the details of users who registered their bags with the service, and that whoever got a hold of it could use it for sophisticated phishing campaigns."

British airways website hacked 380K users affected

Tesla Model S and X cars can be REMOTELY opened

TOR Browser 0-Day

Bad Actors Sizing Up Systems Via Lightweight Recon Malware


1.  BDIR - Olaf Hartong Sysmon Modular

2. BDIR - Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0 - Threat Hunter Playbook

Guest - Katie Nickels

  1. MITRE ATT&CK website


  1. BDIR - Sysmon View and Sysmon Shell

Guest - Katie Nickels

  1. MITRE ATT&CK Navigator


EMOTET - 2 Samples

Sample 1 - Word Doc

  • PowerShell BASE64 blob to hide download

  • Use of DOS Cmd line obfuscation

  • Extracted to AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\slskey.exe (root of folder)

  • Another long random.exe renamed same hash

  • Also \Users\Public 203.exe - root of folder (never good)

  • Lots of .tmp files in users tempt made by slskey.exe

  • Typical Run Key persistence

  • Changed Firewall Policy for Remote Assistance (Different Log !!!)

  • WerFault, so something crashed, watch those logs too

Sample 2 - EXE

  • Deleted loader/installer upon execution

  • Typical Run key persistence

  • AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\random_chars.exe

  • 2nd copy, different hash in ProgramData root (Duh)

  • 3rd copy in ProgramData\GUID folder different hash

  • Created a scheduled task name of a GUID

  • Folder and Task name GUID’s did not match

Lesson Learned

  • Because we are so quick at LOG-MD evals, the malware could wait to do more

  • In one sample it created a task 5 mins or more after running LMD. The Run Key was caught, but another version stored in ProgramData made a Scheduled Task

  • Remember what we said on the last podcast… ENABLE Scheduled Task logging !!!

  • Launch Chrome BEFORE malware eval.. Damn Google Update schedule tasks

  • You might Audit C:\Windows\System32\Tasks folder for Adds


A little known guide of hacking tactics - ATT&CK - PART 1 (TORA TORA TORA)


So what is ATT&CK all about?

  1. What is ATT&CK?

  2. What is the goal of the project?

  3. Why should people care about this project?

  4. What are the components of ATT&CK

  5. What are you working on that is coming up?



The Design and philosophy of ATT&CK

Cyber Analytics Repository:

CAR Exploration Tool (CARET):

Katie’s blogs on applying ATT&CK to threat intelligence: Part 1 and Part 2

Katie and her colleague John Wunder’s BSidesLV slides (YouTube video coming soon!)

Upcoming events for Katie and the team:

  • Katie is briefing at the FireEye Cyber Defense Summit on October 3-4

  • Catch a few team members attending Derbycon

  • ATT&CKcon is on October 23-24 (it will be live streamed if you can’t make it in person)

  • Follow us on Twitter @MITREattack for updates

Contribute !!!
Please contribute to ATT&CK! Email us at


PART 2 - A little known guide of hacking tactics - ATT&CK - PART 2

We will discuss some new Cheat Sheets and what to do with them and why we created them, and some other info you can use

BDIR Podcast Episode-006


JOIN US FOR EPISODE-006, where we will discuss Logging and OUR GUEST WILL BE:

  • Jim Schwar, Lead Analyst (Cybersecurity)

  • Twitter - @jimiDFIR

Join our #Slack Channel! Email us at or or DM us on Twitter @brakesec

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The most expensive Cyber attack EVER !!! (wired)

Not-Petya is estimated to have cost 40 BILLION US Dollars.

City of Atlanta 17 million Ransom Event

More on the costs of the City of Atlanta Ransomware attack, cost 17 MILLION US Dollars

APT32 proves what we say about logging - Monitor Scheduled Tasks

Why Malware Management, some might say Threat Intel is so important to consume and identify artifacts.  Hunt for Scheduled Tasks in your environment


Sadly, none of interest this month ;-(


1.  BDIR - Mitre ATT&CK

Guests - Jim Schwar

  1. Harlan Carvey's Blog


  1. BDIR - WinLogBeat and FileBeat

Sample WinLogBeat and FileBeat .ymk files to start with

Guests - Jim Schwar

  1. Splunk -


Logging - How many tricks does it take to get to the center of a Log-iPop?

This all started with a Tweet:  Jim tweeted - “SIEM is incredibly hard and complex to do right. It takes hundreds/thousands of man hours to tune it well and have rich actionable data. But most people want a quick fix, so they fail miserably”

Michael's response “Mmmm disagree” and this podcast was born

INTERVIEW:  Jim Schwar

So what is difficult about audit logging?

  1. Enabling it

  2. Set the “right” things

  3. Collecting it

  4. Parsing it

  5. The SEIM/Log Management solution

  6. Queries

  7. Alerts

  8. Refinement

  9. Endpoint collection ?

  10. Reduction of noise

  11. AV and Logging Agent

Specifically Events Codes:  
4624 - Success login
4625 - Failed logon
4634 - Logged off
4647 - User initiated logoff
4648 - A logon was attempted using explicit credentials
What are you looking for ?
NOT winlogon, lsass or svchost?
Target different from the host?
4688 - Process Created
4768 - Kerberos Auth
4769 - Kerberos Service Ticket was requested
Kerberoasting detection
Fail_Code="0x0" | where Ticket_Enc_Type="0x17"
4770 - Kerberos Service Ticket was renewed
4771 - Kerberos Pre-Auth

  • Be the 1%

  • Jim Scwar - @jimiDFIR DMs open...

  • Brakeing Down Security Slack Channel - join to associate with the like minded


Malware Management

How to get started using IR Analyst reports to detect and hunt for artifacts

Extra Data in Windows Event Logs

This really only pertains to older systems, but it can save a lot of space if you are a high volume shop (I know cutting out the event descriptions has saved over 100 gigs a day)

The default linux kernel settings are not sufficient to high volumes of data (i.e. log servers), and tuning needs to be done for various items.  But the biggest pain points for me are:

Read/Write Memory and Packet backlog

This document is for the Splunk Streamapp, but the same settings are relevant for any syslog server.

Transparent Huge Pages


Keeps track of connections too long, and does not have enough entries for a host with a lot of systems connecting on ephemeral ports

Splunk UF depends on Windows Event Log Service

The basic problem here is, the UF will start to corrupt logs if it is started before the Event Log service, or if the Event Log service is restarted due to patching, etc…  They way to resolve the issue is to make the service dependent on the Event Log service with a tweak the the UF’s service startup with a registry key.
This issue has existed since at least 6.3 and Splunk support refuses to add the registry key by default, make this widely known, or at the very least add a flag to the installer to add the keys.  So you have to either push it through GPO or some other method in an environment.

It is also good to run a daily check of logs for the string "FormatMessage error" to find out which hosts are corrupting their logs and restart the service.  An “empty” app on a deployment server that is set to restart the agent can be pushed out by Splunk Admins to resolve the problem if a support team or other management options are available.

Time Consuming Issues, that need to be dealt with consistently

  • Are the agents installed on all of your assets?

  • Is the data coming in clean?

  • Are there any broken systems that are generating tons of error logs? (A single host can jam up logging for hundreds/thousands)

  • Are appliances (specifically network devices) still configured to send the appropriate details of logs?

  • New hosts sending data that require a syslog filter to be updated. (This can largely be minimized by sending different types of hosts to different log ports)

  • Time formats in different log formats.

  • Message data NOT needed in your log to shrink the size of the message being consumed into Log Management

Reduce the misc, message data IN YOUR LOGS WHEN CONSUMING THEM.  Blow tHIS AWAY.

This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.
The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.

The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).

The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.

The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.

The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.

The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.

Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.

Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.

Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.

Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.


This event is generated when a logon request fails. It is generated on the computer where access was attempted.

The Subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon.

This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.

The Logon Type field indicates the kind of logon that was requested. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).

The Process Information fields indicate which account and process on the system requested the logon.

The Network Information fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.

The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.

- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.

- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.

- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.


This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.


This event is generated when a logoff is initiated but the token reference count is not zero and the logon session cannot be destroyed.  No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.


This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials.  This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.


Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.

Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.

Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.

Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.


Certificate information is only provided if a certificate was used for pre-authentication.

Pre-authentication types, ticket options, encryption types and result codes are defined in RFC 4120. EditMore Resources


This event is generated every time access is requested to a resource such as a computer or a Windows service.  The service name indicates the resource to which access was requested.

This event can be correlated with Windows logon events by comparing the Logon GUID fields in each event.  The logon event occurs on the machine that was accessed, which is often a different machine than the domain controller which issued the service ticket.

Ticket options, encryption types, and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.


Ticket options and encryption types are defined in RFC 4120.


Certificate information is only provided if a certificate was used for pre-authentication.

Pre-authentication types, ticket options and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.

If the ticket was malformed or damaged during transit and could not be decrypted, then many fields in this event might not be present.


BDIR Podcast Episode-005


Join our #Slack Channel! Email us at or or DM us on Twitter @brakesec

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JOIN US FOR EPISODE-005, where we will discuss WMI and OUR GUEST WILL BE:

  • Chris Truncer - FortyNorthSec
  • Twitter - @ChrisTruncer and @FortyNorthSec
  • Blog -
  • Github -


NEWS-WORTHY - Sysinternals release Sysmon 8.0 and AutoRuns 13.90

Mark and crew over at Microsoft have release updates to two popular tools in Sysmon and AutoRuns.  Sysmon 8 adds a RuleTag field so now you can label your rules and see the rule name in the logs data.  Autoruns fixed data involving WMI, the topic of the day.

Reminder - Do NOT upload files to VirusTotal until you are certain you are not going to disclose anything to the criminals as they will know, that you know about their Fu.  Also, anything you upload can be downloaded by anyone with a VT Private Key and if you upload documents with confidential data, you may create a disclosure for yourself.


Sadly, none of interest this month ;-(


1.  BDIR - WMI vs. WMI: Monitoring for Malicious Activity

2.  Abusing WMI Providers for Persistence

Guests - Chris Truncer

  1. Device Guard Bypass Mitigation Rules


  1. BDIR - WMILM - Phillip Tsukerman

     2. LOG-MD-Pro of course, new WMI persistence feature

Guests - Chris Truncer

  1. WMImplant -
  2. WMIOps (older)


WMI - Exploitation and Detection


Will Schroeder - @ harmj0y

Article on settings needed to enable remote WMI


Matt Graeber BlackHat 2015 - Abusing Windows Management

Instrumentation (WMI) to Build a Persistent, Asyncronous, and Fileless Backdoor

Chris Truncer - WMImplant

Other WMI and Exploit Kits for Testing detection:

ASR rules for blocking wmi and psexec process creation



  1. What is WMI

  2. Why do PenTesters and Red Teamers like it?

  3. What are the components of WMI that IR and defenders need to know about

  4. What should defenders, hunters, IR and Forensic people look for?

  5. How to add WMI to your investigations

    1. WMIC cmd line

    2. CIMOM Registry key

  1. Scan the WMI database

  2. Can you block this type of attack, block the following from being accessible

    1. Admin$

    2. wmic /node:"<hostname or IP>" os get Caption

    3. Change key

  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy - set to “0”
  1. Delete key

  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\FilterAdministratorToken
  1. Disable Remote RPC from the Firewall maybe

  2. Disable DCOM

  3. Testing lab configuration  - See Will’s article below

    1. Add the keys just mentioned

    2. Check Windows firewall for Remote RPC

    3. Test that you can get to Admin$

    4. wmic /node:"<hostname or IP>" os get Caption

  • If it works, you will get the OS of the remote machine and be able to map the ADMIN$ share
  1. What our testing showed

  • Impersonation level - “impersonation” + “identification”

9.  How to test yourself

  • WIn Logging Cheat sheet
  • Humio
  • The tools discussed


BDIR Podcast Episode-004

Join our #Slack Channel! Email us at or or DM us on Twitter @brakesec

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Our guests are Pieter Heyn and Kresten Krab with Humio will discuss with us Cloud based Log Management and/or On-Prem Log Management


  • Pieter Heyn - Sales Manager EMEA of HUMIO
  • Kresten Krab - CTO of HUMIO



NEWS-WORTHY - FBI asks everyone to reboot their routers

Last week, security researchers at Cisco's cyberintelligence unit Talos warned of the attack: malicious software, dubbed VPNFilter, had infected an estimated 500,000 consumer routers in 54 countries and was targeting routers from Linksys, MikroTik, Netgear and TP-Link, and possibly others. 

The FBI on Friday sent out a notice recommending that anyone with a small office or home office router reboot (turn on and off) their devices to stop the malware


Sadly, none of interest this month ;-(


1.  BDIR - The whole list of Windows Logging Cheat Sheets

2.  BDIR - Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 Security Auditing and Monitoring Reference.docx

Guests - HUMIO

  1. Humio of course -


  1. BDIR - Audit your logs to see where your audit logging compares to industry standards - LOG-MD

     2.  BDIR - Add additional details to your logs - The Sysmon Service

Guests - Humio

  1.  Humio of course -


Cloud based Log Management and/or On-Prem Log Management



  • So why do I think this topic is important to IT, InfoSec, IR, Network, and Forensic people?
    • Why security and log management are important aka SIEM
    • Story about SMB needing help on an malware infection, multiple locations
  • MG Top 10 list of tools - Log Management is crucial to Detection and Response
  • Intro by Michael and Brian on how they found Humio 
    • Humio was responsive to our suggestions
    • Other vendors were not, just said yeah, we just wanted your business
  • Cloud log management vs. on-prem
  • MG - I have looked at 10 or more logging solutions and the lack of ease of use is a big one
  • A good log management solution has to have some basic features a lot of solutions lacked or were very buggy
    • Easy to use console
    • Built-in alerting, not as an option
    • Exclusion ability, not this or this or this
    • Save reports and queries
    • Dashboards for those that want them


  • Background of Humio
    • Live data vs query
    • No indexes used
  • Free vs Pro vs. trial vs. On-Prem solutions
    • How much data can I send in the 30 day trail for the SMB type use case?
  • Do you see yourself as a SIEM vendor or wanting to move there?
  • How does GDPR or any compliance regulation affect Cloud shared hosting ?
    • And really is this just solved by going with an On-Prem solution?
    • What basic changes did you have to make being a Euro company in this space?
  • There are a lot of Logging solutions, what gap were you intending to fill; what problem were you trying to solve?
  • New features in the last release you want to mention
  • What are the major differences or advantages that your customers like about Humio?


Our goal for the listeners

  • Try it on your home systems
  • Learn how to do basic logging
  • How to audit a Windows system
  • How to set the audit logging
  • Install the WinLogBeat agent
  • Start with the Winlogbeat config from Malware Archaeology
  • Use Humio
  • Populate it with the queries from the "Windows Humio Logging Cheat Sheet"


BDIR Podcast Episode-003

Join our #Slack Channel! Email us at or or DM us on Twitter @brakesec

Join us for Episode-003, our guest will be:

         Lesley Carhart - Principal Threat Hunter at Dragos Inc.

News-Worthy - City of Atlanta ransomware FOLLOW-Up

Atlanta Working 'Around The Clock' To Fight Off Ransomware Attack



Atlanta government was compromised in April 2017 – well before last week’s ransomware attack

Compromised Connected Fish Tank - Comes from a global threat report (2017) from Darktrace - a summary of their case studies for the year

Malware of the Month

Sigma Ransomware - Notable artifact

  • No text in the body of the message, just an image of text
  • Breaks any scanning of text for passwords to use in the attached Office documents by sandbox evaluation solutions


1.  BDIR - ISO 27035 - Information security incident management

2.  BDIR - NIST 800-61

Guest - Lesley Carhart






  1. BDIR - Blue Team Handbook: Incident Response Edition: A :  by Don Murdoch GSE
  2. BDIR - Blue Team Field Manual (by Alan J White and Ben Clark

Guest - Lesley Carhart

1.  Didier writes lots of handy tools useful for forensics and IR. I use his pdf tools

2.  A fair bit for inspecting suspicious attachments; rtfdump and oledump seem to do the same for OLE and RTF files.

Other tools Lesley recommends you learn:

Books Lesley recommends everyone read for IR

  • Blue Team Field Manual (BTFM) - by Alan White (Author), Ben Clark (Author)
  • Windows Internals, Part 1: System architecture, processes, threads, memory management, and more (7th Edition) 7th Edition - by Pavel Yosifovich (Author), Mark E. Russinovich (Author), David A. Solomon (Author), Alex Ionescu (Author)
  • Windows Forensic Analysis DVD Toolkit, Second Edition 2nd Edition - by Harlan Carvey (Author)
  • Digital Forensics with Open Source Tools: Using Open Source Platform Tools for Performing Computer Forensics on Target Systems: Windows, Mac, Linux, Unix, etc 1st Edition, Kindle Edition - by Cory Altheide (Author), Harlan Carvey (Author)
  • The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory 1st Edition - by Michael Hale Ligh (Author), Andrew Case (Author), Jamie Levy (Author), AAron Walters (Author)
  • Practical Malware Analysis: A Hands-On Guide to Dissecting Malicious SoftwareFeb 1, 2012 - by Michael Sikorski and Andrew Honig

Topic of the Day

The Incident Response Process,  - Program, Plan, Policy, Process, Playbooks, and roles

The Program

  • ISO 27035 - Information security incident management
  • NIST 80-61 - Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (August 2012)




  • Prep, Detect/Analysys, Contain/Eradicate/Recovery, Post Incident Activity - NIST

Playbooks: (or “What to do in the event of...”)

  1. Ransomware

  2. Malware infection

  3. Website defacement

  4. Unauthorized Domain Admin Access

  5. Multiple Simultaneous Logins

  6. Media call / report of an incident from external entity

  7. DoS

8.  Phishing

9.  Credential Stealing phishing  

10.  Lost or stolen equipment

11.  When to use Forensics

12.  How to do forensics

IESO - Cyber Security Forum - Playbooks

CERT SOCIETE GENERALE - IRM (Incident Response Methodologies)

(From a list found on Peerlyst)

  1. Phishing

  2. Virus or Worm

  3. Ensure that the host has an updated virus definition file

  4. Traffic Flows

  5. Denial of service (Network Crafted)

  6. Denial of service (spam)

  7. Host Compromise (Trojan)

  8. Network Compromise (Cracking)

  9. Host Compromise (physical Access)

  10. Domain Hijacking

  11. Dns Cache Poisoning

  12. Suspicious User Activity

  13. User Account Compromised

  14. Unauthorized Access (Employee)

  15. Corporate espionage

  16. Internet Hoaxes

  17. IP Telephony denial of service or Outage

  18. Unauthorized remote access protocol

  19. Suspicious website access

  20. Unexpected administrative account / permissions added.


  • What is each person responsible for?

All the people add up to  and are a part of your CIRT (NOT CERT)

  • Incident Responder / IR Manager

  • Incident Handler

    • Project Manager

    • Communication lead

    • Documentation lead

  • Security Operations Analysts / Triage Analysts

  • Forensic Analysts:

  • Malware Reversers

  • Security Engineering

  • Threat Intelligence

  • Leadership

  • HR

  • PR / Corporate Communications

  • Legal Council

  • IT (Domain Admin, Help Desk, Server Admins, Client / Patch Admins)

  • Audit

  • GRC / Disaster Recovery / Risk Management

  • Developers / AppSec / Product Engineering

War Room

  • What is it and when to use it and why

Tabletop Exercises

  • What should you do here

IR Firm Retainer & Fees can be used for?

  • What can you use them for?

Breach Notification

  • Who is involved

  • What to prepare

  • Whom to involve


Carnegie Mellon - SEI - CSIH


  • SANS


BDIR Podcast Episode-002

Join our #Slack Channel! Email us at or or DM us on Twitter @brakesec

Join us for Episode-002, our guest will be:

         David Longenecker - InfoSec Practitioner

  • Twitter: @dnlongen
  • Blog:
  • GitHub -

News-Worthy - City of Atlanta hit with ransomware, services taken offline

  1. Atlanta Working 'Around The Clock' To Fight Off Ransomware Attack

    1. “Mayor (Keisha Lance Bottoms) told reporters that cybersecurity is now a top priority for the city.”

    2. “Wi-Fi at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport has been shut down as a precaution”

  2. Six days after a ransomware cyberattack, Atlanta officials are filling out forms by hand

    1. “SecureWorks and the city's incident response team are working with law enforcement, including the FBI, Homeland Security and the Secret Service, as well as independent forensics experts and educational partners like Georgia Tech, to determine exactly what happened.”

    2. “I am looking forward to us really being a national model of how cities can shore themselves up and be stronger because of it.” mayor said regarding digital infrastructure




Malware of the Month

Dridex - Artifacts

  1. This came in an email with a URL that auto downloaded and installed the malware, but could be a drive-by as well.
  2. Since Dridex uses actual signed Microsoft binaries located in a different directory (not System32), sideloading is easy, it just has to be named after one of the Dlls that the binary actual needs in the same folder that is usually, and should be located in System32
  3. This method has been making the Con circuit talks as many tools miss or exclude known good Microsoft signed binaries as “Good”.  A popular tool we all use, Microsoft’s Sysinternals ProcessExplorer has an option we all have used to hide the Microsoft signed files to make it easier to see an obvious bad processes.  Dridex exploits this typical behavior by analysts to hide among the known good.
    1. It is important to note that we designed LOG-MD to see these cases since WHERE the file is located can be a BIG clue, even if it is a real and signed MS binary

  4. Morphs on reboot - The DLL changes its hash on each reboot and the .EXE changes as well and the DLL named changed to what will work for that .exe.  So chasing hashes is a waste of time. What you have hash wise is not what the rest of us will have.


5. Uses a valid trusted MS signed binary to launch the Bad DLL, which is named for a correct DLL that is needed by the launcher (GamePanel.exe, UxTheme.dll, CameraSettingsUIHost.exe, DUI70.dll, etc.)

6. Autoruns are a .lnk file in the users Startup folder and a Scheduled Task pointing to another version

7. Files are found in:

  • %windir%\System32\5_Char_random_name
  • %AppData%\5_Char_random_name

8. Uses SVCHost.exe to phone home and communicate

9. Opens a hole for Explorer in the Windows Firewall




  3. Guest - David Longenecker

    1. - Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge. A repository of things for which to ask yourself, "would I detect this? Would it set off any alarms?"

    2. - dozens of tools and exploitation techniques, with detailed artifacts generated by those actions. Again, a great resource for asking "how would I detect this?"


  1. LOG-MD

  2. Guest - David Longenecker

    1. - Didier writes lots of handy tools useful for forensics and IR. I use his pdf tools ( a fair bit for inspecting suspicious attachments; rtfdump and oledump seem to do the same for OLE and RTF files.

Topic of the Day

Windows Logging, Who, What, Where, When, Why

  1. Why is logging important?

    1. Incident took place...what happened?  I don’t know!

    2. Research / hunting.

    3. Alerts

  2. Windows Default logging

    1. Some of the improvements since XP

    2. Default is painfully bad, so at minimum set the following

      1. 4688

      2. 5156

      3. PowerShell

      4. CMD Line Logging

    3. Make checks for

  3. Where does one start to improve logging

    1. Industry Standards

    2. Cheat Sheet(s)

  4. Gaps in the industry standards

    1. Why are they inadequate

  5. Log configurations/properties

    1. Log Sizes

    2. FIFO

  6. Centralized / forwarded vs. Local logging

    1. Why some things shouldn’t be forwarded

    2. Log “nice-to-haves” locally (it won’t kill the box -Microsoft Article)

  7. What tools can you use to collect local logs?

    1. Wevtutil

    2. PowerShell

    3. LOG-MD

  8. Filtering logs on the endpoint

  9. 3rd party logging utilities

    1. Sysmon

    2. WLS

10. Advanced Logging

  • NEW - The Windows Advanced Logging Cheat Sheet

11. Log Attacks

  • Clear the logs
  • Stop the logging service
  • Change size to 1k



BDIR Podcast Episode-001

Join our #Slack Channel! Email us at or or DM us on Twitter @brakesec

Join us for Episode-001, our guest will be:

  • Martin Brough - Manager of the Security Solutions Engineering team in the email phishing industry

Topic of the day will be:

"Credential Stealing emails what can YOU do"

Show Notes:

  • Introductions
  • Introduce our Guest
    • Martin Brough
      • Twitters - @HackerNinja
      • Blog -


  1. The Register: Perv raided college girls' online accounts for nude snaps – by cracking their security questions.  Personal info obtained to pull off 1,400 password resets. Now he's behind bars.

Powell's interest in all this was obtaining private sexually explicit photos, which people apparently store in their email accounts without much thought about security. It's not immediately clear why the large number of such images on the internet did not suffice.

Jonathan C. Powell, who hacked into over 1,000 email accounts in search of sexually explicit images and videos of college-aged women, was jailed for six months for computer fraud, the US Department of Justice said on Thursday.

"During that time frame, those Reset Utility accesses resulted in approximately 18,600 attempted password changes in connection with approximately 2,054 unique [Pace] email accounts, and approximately 1,378 successful password changes in connection with approximately 1,035 unique [Pace] email accounts," explained FBI special agent Christopher Merriman in the complaint.

2. The Hacker News: Beware! Undetectable CrossRAT malware targets Windows, MacOS, and Linux systems

The article states that “As CrossRAT is written in Java, it requires Java to be installed"  Not entirely true, as the dropper can check for java, if none is present, can download JRE and run locally or can install “jportable launcher”.

Also, it is interesting that the article calls it undetectable in the title, but then tells you how to detect it by looking for a runkey.

3. Windows 10 Creator update breaks purposefully set security tweaks

Win 10 fail Tweet.jpg

4. TrickBot

  • Artifacts

    • Delivered by a Word Doc with Macros

      • So cscript and PowerShell to grab the dropper

      • PS gets the dropper and also launches one of the batch files to load

    • Stores files in %appdata%, so Appdata Roaming\localservice

    • Some oddly named binary

    • Client_ID file

    • Group_tag file

    • A directory named Modules

    • You can see a couple batch files in %temp% and the binary before it is copied

    • Persistence is a Task called “services update”

    • Named Pipes connection for PowerShell

    • The IP it uses was a US based hosting service



  • MalPedia - reports and info on malware families and their actors and yara signatures


Topic of the DAY

Credential Stealing emails what can YOU do….

What to look for if you DON’T have a lab or also in your lab

  • Screen Shots – Good indicator a credential stealing site with an authentication page

  • Domain age - How old is the website in days or years.  Is it new? DGA (Domain Generating Algorithms)

  • Blacklists – Is the domain in any blacklists, if so, why is the SMTP gateway not catching it

  • Category – Has the site been categorized (BLOG/Malware/etc.)

  • Reputation – Is this a Bad, Neutral or Good site

  • Country – Where is this URL from

  • Alexa Rating - How known is it

Evaluating it in a Lab

  • LOG-MD Babbeeeee

Steps to take when you get a Phishing email

1.  Of course.. You get an alert of some kind or are notified

2. Get a copy of the email - You can’t evaluate it if you don’t have an actual copy, your help desk copy might not have the context correct

3.  Evaluate the URL

  • In a lab, click all the way through, login too (fake creds)
  • Or with one of the URL eval sites

4.  Block the URL - Ya need a Web Proxy of course

  • Or the IP in the firewall

5.  Monitor the IPs in log management from your firewall logs

  • Who else went there
  • You will have a HUGE gap for offsite/roaming people

6.  Consider Fast and Mass disabling of accounts

7.  Recall the message from your mail servers

  • Keep people from opening it

8.  Monitor any Internet facing non-2-Factor email logins

  • Unless you reset all your users that received the phish

9.  Monitor any Internet facing non-2-Factor VPN logins

  • Unless you reset all your users that received the phish

10.  Monitor any Internet facing non-2-Factor Cloud Storage logins

11.  Monitor any Internet facing non-2-Factor Virtual Desktop logins

12.  Monitor for password resets to make sure you got everybody

13.  Contact the sender to say you have been owned

  • Assuming you know it actually came from them.. SMTP logs

14.  Create a Report

  • What happened, how did it come in
  • What improvements can be made to avoid it
  • Improvements to monitoring or hunting

15.  Update your Email Investigation process

  • You will improve each time
  • Someone will need to do this when YOU are not at work or sleeping

BDIR Podcast Episode-000

Join our #Slack Channel! Email us at or or DM us on Twitter @brakesec

Join us for our inaugural podcast, our guests will be:

  • Dave Cowan - Forensic Lunch Podcast and G-C Partners
  • Tyler Hudak - Trainer in Malware Analysis and Reverse Engineering

Brian and I will kick off this new podcast, and the topic of the day will be:

"What is this new podcast all about, what will it cover? 

Incident Response, Malware Discovery, and Basic Malware Analysis, Detection and Response, Active Defense, Threat Hunting, and where does it fit within DFIR"

Show Notes:

  • Introductions
  • Introduce our Guests
    • Tyler Hudak
    • Dave Cowan




Tyler’s Pick

Dave’s Pick


Topic of the DAY

What is this new podcast all about?  Incident Response, Detection and Response, Active Defense, Threat Hunting, Malware Discovery, Basic Malware Analysis

Incident Response.JPG
DFIR width.JPG
  1. Define IR

    1. The process by which you respond to an incident (legal sense)?

    2. Do we agree on the diagram above?

      1. Define Discovery

      2. Define Analysis

      3. Define Forensics

    3. Does IR include preparation for an attack?

  2. What is Active Defense?

    1. Your definition will vary

  3. Threat Hunting - where do Hunters fit into all of this?

    1. JP.Cert paper

BDIR Podcast Sponsor:


This Podcast Sponsored by:



Brian and I are embarking on an expansion of the Brakeing Down Security Podcast, adding the Brakeing Down Incident Response Podcast (BD-IR Podcast).

This will be a once a month podcast with a few extra casts here and there.  The focus will be in the area of Detection and Incident Response, Malware Discovery, Basic Malware Analysis, Threat Hunting and improvements to your overall security posture.


Join us !